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Abstract 
This article empirically investigates the results of an expert-based method to identify ‘patent 
thickets’ for a unique USPTO dataset. The research aims to identify the overall effect of 
patent thickets on patent pendency.  We find that patents belonging to a thicket are, on 
average, granted protection sooner. At the same time, we show that patent groups with higher 
thicket frequency have higher average pendency time, as do patents within larger thickets.  
Both suggest spillovers in processing time across patents.  We additionally find mild support 
that the first patent in a thicket has a longer pendency period.   
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1. Introduction – patent thickets, quality of patents and pendency time 
 
A robust literature has developed diagnosing the factors underlying the growth in patent filing 
over the past thirty years (Kortum and Lerner, 1999, and Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). This has 
included a spate of papers focussing on strategic effects in the presence of patent thickets, 
defined as “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those that seek to commercialize new 
technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees” (Shapiro, 2001). While many of these 
have been generally negative on the innovation and diffusion incentives in the presence of 
thickets (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998, Eisenberg, 2001, and Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), more 
recent papers (Galasso and Schankerman, 2010, and Lichtman, 2006) have been positive.   
 
Thickets clearly exist (Shapiro, 2001), and both anecdotal evidence and data work suggest 
that they induce strategic effects. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) note that companies may file 
numerous patents to increase their chances of covering a technology that would become 
widely used, hoping to receive royalties from licensing their intellectual property. Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) provide support for this approach by studying patenting behaviour in 
semiconductors, where thickets are present, via both empirical work and interviews. They 
reveal that larger firms use patents to amass bargaining chips as a strategic response to hold 
up and as part of a “patent portfolio race”, while smaller design firms use them to secure 
“bulletproof” rights to niche technologies to acquire venture capital funding.  Galasso et al 
(2013) further bolster this view by observing that trading patents to a large patent holder 
significantly reduces the risk of litigation, suggesting that “plugging holes” is an important 
role for individual patents, as is consolidation in the hands of a firm that can use such patents 
in settlements that avoid the courtroom when disputes arise. Ziedonis (2004) and Noel and 
Schankerman (2013) find that patenting activity rises in the presence of fragmentation, 
supporting the view that hold up can potentially raise the incentives to patent. Galasso and 
Schankerman (2010) extend this to showing that fragmentation tends to decrease delay overall 
in patent settlements due to the interaction of the value of the underlying patents with 
fragmentation. They also note that the existence of substitutes can affect litigation delays.  
Finally, Hall et al (2015) present a nuanced view, separating out the effect of hold up in 
thickets, with a negative effect on entry, from the effect of complexity, with a positive effect. 
They associate complexity with the possibility of developing a technology in a way that has 
few competitors, whereas hold up is associated with entry costs.       
 
The effects of thickets on the delay in obtaining a patent grant (“pendency”) – and conditional 
upon entry - has not been studied systematically. Matutes et al (1996) suggest that a wide set 
of applications of an initial “fertile” idea should result in changes in the writing of patents as 
initial patent holders attempt to capture rights to future spin-offs. While this has implications 
for delay associated with the first patent in a thicket they do not conduct an empirical 
exploration to gauge the magnitude of this effect. Popp, Juhl and Johnson (2004) find in 
interviews of patent examiners that the breadth of claims writing matters to pendency. Their 
empirical work suggests that crowded technology fields may have a longer or a shorter 
pendency, depending on how interference among competing claims interacts with a quicker 
search for prior art. Other papers have looked at patent pendency, but have not addressed 
thicket issues specifically. Harhoff and Wagner (2009) note that the patent grant carries 
important strategic, legal and financial implications separate from the patent application. 
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Hence, applicants should be willing to invest effort in pushing through patent applications 
where they anticipate more valuable income streams.  The patent application process should 
be affected by many considerations, however.  Regibeau and Rockett (2010) reinforce this 
point, and bolster it by adding examiner process effects such as learning about technologies as 
patents accumulate in a technology area.     
 
None of these papers investigate the effect of thickets on pendency empirically, a gap that we 
address. Observing the effect of thickets on pendency is important in its own right: the 
workings of the patent examination process are important for innovation incentives. 
Furthermore, behaviour at this stage can serve to confirm or question previous results on 
strategic incentives to obtain patents where thickets are present. Our results are 
complementary to the results of Hall et al (2015) in the sense that we study the effect of 
thickets conditional upon entry into a technological area, whereas they examine the effects on 
entry itself.  
 
The patent examination process carries its own analytical challenges, of course, which must 
be incorporated into our empirical work. To illustrate, we should observe greater urgency and 
shorter pendency times for patents in a thicket if we view them as bargaining chips or the 
means to create an unassailable collection of rights. On the other hand, in the presence of 
thickets, the examiner’s task of disentangling the rights to a technology via the claims 
approval process should become more difficult, as suggested by Popp et al (2004).  
Furthermore, Lemley and Shapiro (2007) suggest that applicants may purposefully delay the 
issuance of their patents to “take companies by surprise”. While more recent patent 
publication deadlines of 18 months from filing in the US have reduced the possibilities for 
this type of “submarining”, Harhoff and Wagner (2009) suggest that uncertainty in the precise 
metes and bounds of the patent may have strategic value of its own. This uncertainty would 
be present during the pendency period regardless of disclosure at 18 months.  
 
Taken together, then, the literature has identified several effects that may affect pendency in 
the presence of thickets: increased complexity in examination and the desire to increase 
uncertainty should both have a positive effect, while the desire to build a solid portfolio 
should have a negative effect. The combined effect of these opposing forces is the empirical 
question that we study here. We collect a sample of patents that do or do not belong to 
thickets, as measured by the views of technology experts. This is a novel, but direct, way to 
measure patent thickets and is set out in detail in another paper (Gatkowski et al, 2017). After 
presenting our data and methodology, we move to our results.   
 
Our main result is that the effect of thickets on individual patent pendency is – overall -  
negative, which confirms the view that thickets are associated with an increased urgency to 
obtain full patent rights (conditional upon entry). In other words, if we control for the 
technological and structural characteristics of a patent, which should themselves affect delays, 
we find that being in a thicket tends to decrease delay further.  This does not negate the 
positive effects of thickets on delay, but suggests that empirically the negative effects 
dominate. 
 
At the same time, we find that the ratio of thickets to the total patents in a technology group 
increases pendency aside from the fixed effect of the group itself. A possible interpretation is 
that an externality exists among patents in technology groups associated with thickets, 
slowing down the process for the group overall even if patents belonging to thickets proceed 
faster.  Bolstering the view of externalities among patents, we find a positive effect of the 
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thicket size (or “count”) on pendency times within the thicket. This effect loses significance 
when controls for examiners and attorneys are added, which may be because of the general 
decrease in significance due to the large reduction in degrees of freedom or because attorney 
and examiner effects largely absorb thicket count. This could be the case if, for example, 
certain attorneys and examiners were associated with the type of thicket that is generated. 
 
We find some evidence of increased delay of the first thicket in a patent, suggesting that firms 
may anticipate future work and put more care into the writing of “pioneer” applications. We 
find only mild evidence of shorter delays among filers with larger patent holdings: with all 
controls added this loses significance and even changes sign.     
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology and data, including our 
method of measuring thickets using expert opinion. Section 3 presents our results. We have 
been selective in what we report, so some of our results are summarised in the text only.  
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
We conducted econometric analysis of a combined USPTO dataset and a unique qualitative 
assessment of patents. The qualitative assessment was conducted by subject matter experts in 
fields to which the patents belonged. The complete dataset consists of 12,312 patents from 58 
patent groups (listed in Appendix 1) and contains information on the filing company, 
application and granting dates, and the number of claims. The USPTO dataset was further 
complemented with publicly available aggregated data. 
 
Eight subject matter experts were selected to review patents in 58 patent groups. Each was 
asked to identify patents belonging to patent thickets and assess the innovativeness of each 
patent. From their qualitative assessment, 307 patent thickets containing 2732 patents were 
identified.  To standardise their work a thicket definition coined by Shapiro (2001) was 
selected: “Patent thickets are dense webs of overlapping intellectual property rights owned by 
one or more different companies (patent owners), which create a potential high cost in 
commercializing a new technology, and this cost is difficult to assess upfront.”  They were 
asked to identify the overall significance of the patent’s contribution to the field as a measure 
of innovativeness.   
 
Identifying patent thickets this way allows us to capture flexibly any linkages among patents 
including complementarity, citation and substitutability links. On the other hand, it is 
subjective so we must use the measure under the implicit assumption that the experts are 
correct2.
                                                 
1 Here, we do not separate out complementary and substitution links, as in Galasso and Schankerman (2010).  
We leave a full discussion of our method to other work, see Gatkowski et al (2017). 
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The complete data used in the econometric model consists of: 
 
a) individual data from the USPTO on patents granted in specific patent USPC groups, 
which reflect a variety of disciplines such as: chemistry (e.g. crystallization), 
electricity (e.g. fault detecting), drugs (e.g. antibodies), dentistry, bleaching and 
dyeing, nanostructure). 
 
The first patent in the sample was granted on 06.01.1976 and the most recent on 
24.03.2015; the data contains information drawn from all patents within the group and 
including: filing date, grant date, USPC groups, assignee, number of claims, examiner 
and attorney.  Forward citations are the first four years of citations after grant while 
backwards citations include all references. This measure is, then, standardised for all 
patents in the dataset even if more data is available, as is standard in the literature, to 
prevent sample truncation effects. As changes in patent legislation were enacted in the 
middle of our sample period, we conduct robustness tests that separate out the data 
into two groups pre and post 2001. Finally, it is important to the results that our 
technology groups are “narrow” rather than “broad”, since the narrow groupings allow 
us to control specifically for the place of each patent in its technology cycle. This is 
important to isolating learning effects, as pointed out by Régibeau and Rockett (2010). 
 
b) data on the total number of applications filed and patents granted by the USPTO 
(2016a) during the period 1976-2014, which were used in our initial experiments.  
 
c) total expenses of USPTO during the period 1992-2014 (based on USPTO, 2016b) 
were included in initial experiments. 
 
d) expert-identified sets: a) patents belonging to a thicket, b) ‘innovativeness’ of a patent 
(measured on five-point scale). The latter is a proxy for both a ‘value’ and a ‘novelty’ 
of a technology – which, in literature, is usually approximated by forward and 
backward citations. While we benefit from a broad conception of innovativeness 
(including pure scientific merit) with this methodology, we rely on the subjective 
evaluations as being a true reflection of how novel the underlying technology is. We 
also use forward and backward citations to measure value independently in a manner 
closer to the literature. 
 
To minimize the possibly distorting effect of sample selection and truncation at the margins of 
the covered period, we have limited the sample to the patents that were filed between 1976 
and 2010. The resulting sample consists of 8,644 patents. For specifications that included 
USPTO expenses, only used post-1992 data was available for all data, so the dataset shrinks 
to 7,111 observations.   
 
We investigate the connection between thickets and pendency time, where pendency time is 
the dependent variable, calculated as the difference between the grant date and the filing date, 
and expressed in number of days. To diagnose effects more finely, we additionally include:   
 
• ‘Belonging to a thicket (patent later than the first)’ – a binary variable which indicates 
whether a patent was identified by an examining expert to be a part of a thicket, but 
without patents for which ‘First patent in a thicket’ is 1 (see below).  
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• ‘First patent in a thicket’ – this binary takes the value of 1 when a patent has the 
earliest filling date within its thicket. 
• Thicket count – is the number of patents in a thicket to which a given patent belongs, 
measured within the universe of patents reviewed by the experts. The variable takes a 
value of 0 for non-thicket patents.  
• Thicket ratio –  a group-level variable. This is the number of patents belonging to any 
thicket divided by the total number of patents in a given group (in accordance with the 
USPC classification) within the analysed sample.  
 
Control variables include claims per patent and number of USPC patent groups to which a 
patent was assigned as a reflection of examiner task complexity. Complexity of the patent’s 
coverage is also controlled for by the number of backward citations within field and the 
number of technology groups to which the patent was assigned. We also control for 
innovativeness, which is a grade assigned to a patent by experts based on the overall 
contribution of the patent to the field with values of: 1 – very low innovativeness; 2 – low 
innovativeness; 3 – medium innovativeness; 4 – high innovativeness; 5 – very high 
innovativeness.  This can be taken as a reflection of novelty. Value is controlled for more 
narrowly by forward citations by patents filed for no later than during the next four years3. 
 
  
                                                 
3
 Forward citations are calculated only within our sample – so they are limited to the groups in our sample and 
patents granted no later than on 24.03.2015. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in regression models. 
Variable Aggregation level 
Average/ 
proportion Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Pendency time 
(dependent 
variable) 
Individual 
patent 
952 837 53 5,473 505 
Belonging to a 
thicket (patent 
later than the 
first) 
17.5% Binary variable 
First patent in a 
thicket 2.5% Binary variable 
Number of 
claims 17 14 1 303 14 
Number of 
groups 6.76 5 1 99 5.71 
# of backward 
citations 1.81 1 0 75 4.02 
# of earlier 
successful 
applications 
394.8 273 1 1885 351.72 
# of forward 
citations 0.65 0 0 29 1.79 
Having > 4 
previous patents      35.7% Binary variable 
Innovativeness: 
very low 1% Binary variable 
Innovativeness: 
low 24% Binary variable 
Innovativeness: 
medium 57% Binary variable 
Innovativeness: 
high 15% Binary variable 
Innovativeness: 
very high 3% Binary variable 
Thicket count Thicket 7.44 3 1 89 10.98 
Thicket ratio Group of patents 0.24 0.21 0 0.76 0.19 
No of 
applications to 
USPTO in a 
year of applying 
(in thousands) Year 
243 189 108 520 132 
No of patents 
granted by 
USPTO in a 
123 110 52 244 51 
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year of applying 
(in thousands) 
USPTO budget 
in a year of 
applying (in 
Billion USD, 
2014 prices) 
13.9 13.6 5.9 22 5.1 
Source: Own estimates. 
 
The results of five different models are presented, although our commentary reflects many 
other experiments that we do not report.  The general specification is as follows: 
 
 =  + 	
 +  +  +  
(15) 
 
where i denotes a patent, j(i) a thicket to which patent i belongs (if it does to any), k(i) a patent 
group to which patent i belongs and t(i) a filling year for patent i. X, Y, Z and T stand for 
matrices of (continuous or dummy) variables describing, respectively, patents, thickets, 
groups and years. 
 
The estimation method is OLS (ordinary least squares)4. Reported p-values for standard errors 
have been estimated using heteroscedasticity-corrected estimators suggested by MacKinnon 
and White (1985).5 
 
3. Results 
 
Our main results are presented in table 2. Five experiments are presented in the five columns, 
each with different set of controls, listed at the bottom of the table. The first equation is the 
baseline, grouping all the data together. It includes workload information from the USPTO 
but otherwise excludes controls for technology groups, years, attorneys and examiners. The 
second column adds budgetary information for the USPTO, the third eliminates the workload 
and budgetary information but includes a control for each year, the fourth adds to this a 
control for technology group and the final column adds controls for attorneys and examiners.  
Each column adds to the understanding of the explanatory variables, listed in the left hand 
column. Pendency is the dependent variable for all experiments.  Results for controls are 
included in Appendix 2, rather than in the main table.   
 
Taken together, these five versions all suggest that patents belonging to a thicket have, on 
average, shorter pendency times - depending on the type of specification - of 2.5-4 months.  
Given that the average patent has a pendency of about two to three years, this is a strong 
reduction.  When we divide up our data into pre-2001 and post-2001 periods, we see that the 
thicket effect becomes generally stronger in the latter period even when controls for thicket 
size are added. In terms of whether this effect is due to the technical complexity of the group 
rather than the existence of the thicket in the sense of hold up, as noted by Hall et al (2015), 
we note several points. First, the effect is present even when we control for narrow 
technology group, and we see the effect regardless of controlling for backwards citations, 
number of claims, and the number of groups to which the patent belongs. The underlying 
                                                 
4
 All estimation conducted in R. 
5
 In particular, the HC1 estimator has been used. 
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complexity of the technology itself should be filtered out by these controls, even if the control 
is not the same as in the Hall et al (2015) paper. The result is very stable across experiments.   
 
This result does not apply, however, to the earliest application in each thicket. This might be 
expected if the development of the thicket is not well anticipated: the first patent in the thicket 
is not yet in a thicket, after all. Indeed, the coefficient is not significant and remains small 
until we reach column five. 
 
With all controls for attorneys, examiners, groups and years the pendency time for the first-in-
thicket patent becomes significant and positive.  The change when we control for examiners 
and attorneys is remarkable, and suggests that stripped of the confounding factors, a first-in-a-
thicket patent would be granted more than 2 months later than the benchmark (not-in-a-
thicket) patents. This is true even when we control for special features that might characterise 
these patents, such as the number of claims, and the innovativeness of the patent.   
 
This result is consistent with Matutes et al’s (1996) contention that, when future innovations 
are anticipated, filers should delay first patents in a group of related work so as to include as 
many claims as possible and to write each claim as broadly as possible. We control directly 
for additional claims. Those have a consistent positive effect, which Regibeau and Rockett 
(2010) and Harhoff and Wagner (2009) interpret as reflecting the complexity of the review 
process. Any additional strategic effect via the writing of claims, and which appears during 
the pendency period rather than before filing, works via secrecy in the Matutes et al (1996) 
model. In our data, however, secrecy during the entire pendency period is only the case in the 
earlier portion of our data (pre 2001). After 2001, applications were published after 18 
months, which is about half of the average pendency period. When we isolate pre- and post-
2001 periods we lose significance for our separate measure of the first patent in the thicket 
when all controls are added. Focussing on the first four columns, however, the effect is, 
indeed, positive for the pre-2001 period and significantly negative for the post-2001 period. 
Hence, there is modest support for a significant effect of “care” in writing the claims for 
pioneer patents. 
 
Groups that contain a higher ratio of patents identified to be part of a thicket have, on average, 
a substantially longer pendency time. Indeed, this is one of the strongest effects in the results.  
Hence, while an individual patent that belongs to a thicket receives less delay the overall 
effect of thickets is to increase delay for the group.  This would be consistent with the view 
that additional complexity in review spills over to other patents.  A clear channel for this is 
workload constraints6. The idea that thickets increase the complexity of review is supported 
by the positive but small coefficient on the number of patents in a thicket (thicket count). The 
additional effect of a larger thicket on review times loses significance when we control for 
examiners and attorneys. This may be due to the large loss of degrees of freedom when we 
include controls for all these agents or it may be because examiners and attorneys tend to be 
associated with certain types of patent filings. 
 
After presenting the variables directly related to thickets, we separately report results for 
additional controls relating to the complexity of review (as well as of technology) and the 
effects of experience. There are a few interesting findings. 
 
                                                 
6
 This variable is dropped once we insert group controls, as in columns four and five, since it is redundant. 
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The number of patent groups to which each patent has been assigned - as a measure of 
interdisciplinarity – enters positively, although unsurprisingly the effect disappears when we 
control for group, since interdisciplinarity may be largely related to the technology class.   
 
The number of earlier applications within the technology group enters negatively in the last 
two columns, which are the appropriate focus since group and attorney/examiner effects will 
be confounded with the results in the first three columns. We interpret this negative sign as a 
learning effect by examiners and filers alike, as in Regibeau and Rockett (2010). Indeed, that 
paper points out that controlling narrowly for technology is important to having a negative 
effect (of learning), rather than a positive effect.  Indeed, the pattern of sign, moving from 
positive to negative as we add controls, is the one that they underline in their paper so we take 
our results as consistent with theirs.    
 
We also see a negative effect and significant effect of patent portfolio size in the first three 
columns. This is consistent with the view that larger holders may have increased incentive to 
push through their patents regardless of learning effects: a secure patent portfolio may be a 
powerful tool, as Galasso et al (2013) and others, summarised above, have argued. 
 
In keeping with the literature, the number of forward citations enters negatively: forward 
citations can measure value of the invention, and a higher value would generate urgency in 
review so that the larger profit stream could be moved forward. 
 
The number of backward citations to references, as a measure of complexity of review as well 
as of technology, enters positively as one would expect and consistently with the results of 
Popp, Juhl and Johnson (2004). Workload measures at the USPTO level enter predictably, 
with a surge in applications increasing pendency and a surge in grants reducing it (since 
workload reflects “active” applications). Contemporaneous budget measures are associated 
with increased pendency, but since the budget grows in response to pendency (among other 
factors), and grows over time, we take the positive coefficient as a reflection of the underlying 
process driving both budgets and pendency jointly in the face of rising overall applications.   
 
The differences in pendency time between patent groups are statistically and economically 
significant, as are the effects of examiners and attorneys, following Cotropia et al (2013) and 
others. Notably, some areas where there has been controversy about patentability, such as 
recombinant DNA technology, exhibit significantly longer pendency times.  Equally, some 
areas where there has been some pressure to release commercial results earlier, such as 
surgery or therapeutic devices, exhibit significantly shorter pendencies. It is also the case that 
pendency time has decreased significantly over the period we study, although this effect 
shows up mainly post-2001. Innovativeness enters positively, but not significantly even if we 
aggregate categories of innovativeness7. We interpret this as suggesting that scientific merit 
does not in itself affect the pendency process either via the evaluation of novelty or by the 
effect of experience.   
 
Finally, the results in the last column have two features that reflect the inclusion of dummies 
for attorneys and examiners. First, the constant is larger and reflects the time that the 
(arbitrary) patent in the “undummied” group took to be reviewed. This constant does not, 
then, have any particular significance in itself since it reflects the characteristics of an 
arbitrary actor in the process. Second, the large change in degrees of freedom reflects the fact 
                                                 
7
 These are available from the authors upon request. 
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that we controlled for individual attorneys and examiners at a detailed level rather than simply 
controlling for those who handled a larger number of patents.
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Table 2.  Regression Results (dependent variable – pendency in days) 
                                                       I                     II                     III                      IV                     V 
Belonging to thicket                -98.378***    -121.172***    -98.972***      -123.025***   -80.987**                                
(after the first)                          (20.082)          (23.850)          (19.918)           (19.661)          (33.025) 
 
First patent in thicket               12.019            -3.435              1.925                -2.321             87.435** 
                                                 (32.404)          (38.140)          (31.919)            (28.567)         (41.608) 
 
Thicket count                           1.271**            1.386**           1.310**             1.783**          1.009 
                                                (0.541)              (0.617)            (0.535)              (0.560)            (0.843) 
 
Thicket ratio for group           297.797***      380.472***      302.657***         
(%)                                         (38.595)           (49.213)           (38.345) 
 
Number of claims                  2.737***          2.636***          2.502***           2.574***        2.762***            
                                               (0.418)             (0.479)              (0.415)              (0.408)           (0.664) 
 
Number of groups                 8.858***           8.380***           8.870***          -0.220             -2.754 
                                              (1.130)              (1.132)              (1.137)              (1.051)            (2.066) 
 
Number of backwards          6.525***           5.800***           5.058***          7.140***         6.826** 
citations                                (1.436)             (1.444)               (1.451)             (1.545)            (2.986) 
 
Number of earlier                0.100***          0.089***            0.098***         -0.101***        -0.133** 
successful applications       (0.020)             (0.020)               (0.020)               (0.031)            (0.058) 
 
Number of forward            -42.570***      -44.246***          -42.275***       -39.870***      -32.268*** 
citations                              (2.442)            (2.793)                 (2.461)             (2.290)             (4.074) 
  
Number of previous          -28.661***       -29.124***          -32.038***        -15.832            18.730 
patents > 4                        (11.097)            (12.555)               (11.056)           (11.098)         (21.933) 
  
Applications in year          2.016***          3.710***                            
(thousands)                       (0.118)             (0.383) 
 
Patents granted in year    -3.322***       -4.786*** 
(thousands)                       (0.305)             (0.413) 
 
USPTO budget                                         16.110*** 
(billion USD, 2014 prices)                      (3.152) 
 
USPTO budget squared                          -1.603*** 
                                                                 (0.254) 
Controls: 
Innovativeness                    Y                     Y                            Y                       Y                         Y 
Group                                 N                    N                            N                       Y                         Y 
Year                                   N                     N                            Y                       Y                         Y               
Attorney/examiner             N                     N                            N                      N                         Y  
   
Constant                          680.545***     489.838***          573.387***    654.892***         2223.291*** 
                                       (59.952)            (86.471)              (66.429)          (70.670)              (258.000) 
 
Observations                  8644                7111                       8644                 8644                   8644 
 
R2                                  0.134                0.136                      0.154                0.212                  0.696 
 
Adjusted R2                      0.133                0.134                      0.149                0.203                  0.396 
 
Residual Std Error       470.156           490.397                 465.632            450.869              392.380 
                                    (df = 8627)      (df = 7092)           (df = 8595)      (df = 8542)          (df = 4357) 
 
F Statistic                    83.768***        62.068***           32.644***        22.735***            2.322*** 
                                   (df = 16; 8627) (df = 18; 7092)   (df = 48; 8595) (df = 101; 8542) (df = 4286; 4357) 
 
Note:  *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.     Source: Own Estimates 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Our results support recent findings relating fragmentation and the incentive to obtain patents, 
but extends them to the pendency period when the patent grant is at stake rather than the 
application or entry into the technological field. We see a negative relationship between 
pendency time and belonging to a thicket, which we interpret as the effect of stronger 
incentives to push thicket patents through the examination process.  We also observe, what we 
propose to interpret as spillovers in pendency times where thickets are present, as larger 
thickets and a larger ratio of thickets in a technology group both carry a positive effect on 
pendency times. A plausible mechanism exists for spillovers: limits on total workload may 
mean that lower pendency times for certain types of patents result in larger pendency times 
for others. We do not measure these spillovers directly, but if we take this mechanism at face 
value this potential spillover suggests that the overall effect of thickets on pendency may not 
be to shorten it overall even if individual patents are moved forward in the review process. 
 
Additionally, we observe that the first patent in a thicket may have longer pendency, which 
may reflect broader claim drafting and modestly supporting the contention of Matutes et al 
(1996) on strategic effects.  We see greater experience playing a role at all levels in our data, 
and a general move towards shorter pendency times, absent thicket considerations.  
 
We should qualify our results by noting that we used experts to classify patents into thickets, 
rather than the triples measure proposed by Von Graevenitz et al (2011). While we leave to 
another paper (Gatkowski et al, 2017) the consideration of the merits of our process versus 
others, we should note that we used a different expert for each of our technology groupings, 
following their expertise, so that results that we see persist even when we control for groups.  
This could be interpreted as robust to errors of individual experts, at the very least. Indeed, 
when we control for groups rather than aggregating groups together (as we have done in 
different runs of each of the columns), we see little variance in the thicket coefficients, giving 
us some confidence in the results. A downside of the method is, of course, that our dataset is 
smaller since we are limited by the time that the experts could devote to us. This may limit 
statistical significance in some cases.  This is particularly true when we control for attorneys 
and examiners, at which point we lose many degrees of freedom, and when we add groups 
since we control for group at the narrow level. 
 
Finally, Popp, Juhl and Johnson (2004) suggest that more complex review processes, as one 
might expect within a thicket, might result in lower quality review due to constraints on 
examiner time.  If this is the case, the shorter lags we observe for thicket patents might be due 
to a systematically lower quality of the thicket patent documents.  This is an issue that 
deserves more attention, including investigation of the issue of determining quality of patents.  
We leave this to future work.  Further work could also include adding the complementarity 
and substitutability measures suggested by Galasso and Schankerman (2010) to diagnose the 
composition of the expert-identified thickets and an associated analysis of net citations. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 3. Names of USPC groups used in the analysis.  
Class and 
group Name 
205/251 
Electrolytic coating (process, composition and method of preparing composition). 
Depositing predominantly alloy coating. Gold is predominant constituent. Including arsenic, 
indium or thallium. 
205/564 Electrolytic coating (process, composition and method of preparing composition). Preparing 
single metal. Gallium, germanium, indium, vanadium or molybdenum produced. 
23/295R Chemistry: physical processes. Crystallization 
23/302A Chemistry: physical processes. Crystallization. Alkali method and ammonium compounds. Ammonium compounds 
23/303 Chemistry: physical processes. Crystallization. Alkali method and ammonium compounds. Common salt 
23/305A Chemistry: physical processes. Crystallization. Heavy metal or aluminum compounds. Aluminum compounds 
23/305R Chemistry: physical processes. Crystallization. Heavy metal or aluminum compounds 
23/306 Chemistry: physical processes. Concentration of liquids in liquids 
23/307 Chemistry: physical processes. Concentration of liquids in liquids. With direct heating 
23/313R Chemistry: physical processes. Agglomerating 
324/509 Electricity: measuring and testing. Fault detecting in electric circuits and of electric 
components of ground fault indication 
324/512 Electricity: measuring and testing. Fault detecting in electric circuits and of electric 
components for fault location 
324/525 Electricity: measuring and testing. Fault detecting in electric circuits and of electric 
components for fault location by resistance or impedance measuring 
345/427 Selective visual display systems. Computer graphics processing. Three dimension. Space transformation 
345/9 Selective visual display systems. Image superposition by optical means. Plural image 
superposition 
348/67 Television. Improving the 3D impression of a displayed stereoscopic image 
382/107 Image analysis. Applications. Motion or velocity measuring 
382/209 Image analysis. Pattern recognition. Template matching 
424/114 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Plural fermentates of different origin 
424/195.16 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Extract or material containing or 
obtained from a unicellular fungus as active ingredient 
424/78.01 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Digestive system regulator containing 
solid synthetic organic polymer 
424/78.02 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Topical body preparation containing 
solid synthetic organic polymer 
424/78.08 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Solid synthetic organic polymer 
424/780 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Extract or material containing or 
obtained from a micro-organism as active ingredient 
424/800 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Antibody or fragment thereof whose 
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amino acid sequence is disclosed in whole or in part 
424/801 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving antibody or fragment thereof produced by recombinant dna technology 
424/802 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Antibody or antigen-binding fragment thereof that binds gram-positive bacteria 
424/803 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Antibody or antigen-binding fragment thereof that binds gram-negative bacteria 
424/804 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving IGG3, IGG4, IGA, or IGY 
424/805 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving IGE or IGD 
424/806 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving IGM 
424/807 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving IGM. Monoclonal 
424/808 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Involving IGM. Human 
424/94.1 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions. Enzyme or coenzyme containing 
433/215 Dentistry. Method or material for testing, treating, restoring, or removing natural teeth 
435/6.19 Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving nucleid acid. Detectic nucleic 
acid by specific antibody, protein or ligand-receptor biding assay 
435/7.7 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which a 
label present is an apoenzyme, prosthetic group, or enzyme cofactor 
435/7.71 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which a 
label present is an enzyme inhibitor or functions to alter enzyme activity 
435/7.72 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which a 
label present is an enzyme substrate or substrate analogue 
435/7.93 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which an 
enzyme present is a label. Competitive assay 
435/7.94 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which an 
enzyme present is a label. Sandwich assay 
435/7.95 
Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology. Involving antigen-antibody binding, 
specific binding protein assay or specific ligand-receptor binding assay. Assay in which an 
enzyme present is a label. Indirect assay 
604/890.1 Surgery. Controlled release therapeutic device or system 
8/115.51 Bleaching and dyeing. Chemical modification of textiles or fibers or products thereof 
8/400 Bleaching and dyeing. Measuring, testing or inspecting dye process 
8/401 Bleaching and dyeing. Using enzymes, dye process, composition, or product of dyeing 
8/438 Bleaching and dyeing. Process of extracting or purifying of natural dye 
8/443 Bleaching and dyeing. Weighting process 
8/493 Bleaching and dyeing. Overall dimensional modification or stabilization. Modification of 
molecular structure of substrate by chemical means 
977/762 Nanostructure. Nanowire or quantum wire (axially elongated structure having two dimensions of 100 nm or less) 
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977/773 Nanostructure. Nanoparticle (structure having three dimensions of 100 nm or less) 
977/778 Nanostructure. Within specified host or matrix material (e.g., nanocomposite films, etc.) 
977/810 Nanostructure. Of specified metal or metal alloy composition 
977/881 Manufacture, treatment or detection of nanostructure. With arrangement, process, or 
apparatus for testing. With arrangement, process, or apparatus for testing 
977/903 Specified use of nanostructure. For conversion, containment, or destruction of hazardous 
material 
977/904 Specified use of nanostructure. For medical, immunological, body treatment, or diagnosis 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 4. Controls used in regression models (dependent variable – pendency in days) 
 I II III IV V 
Innovativeness = 1 
(very low) benchmark 
  
Innovativeness = 2 
(low) 12.455 7.915 9.643 23.028 -25.306 
 
(58.581) (68.757) (58.175) (57.845) (84.459) 
Innovativeness = 3 
(medium) 7.567 -3.673 5.662 19.457 -33.817 
 
(58.032) (68.175) (57.683) (57.390) (84.458) 
Innovativeness = 4 
(high) 6.058 -3.624 3.529 42.767 -15.428 
 
(59.114) (69.340) (58.761) (58.681) (86.392) 
Innovativeness = 5 
(very high) 104.018 114.806 100.783 48.094 -28.934 
 
(68.551) (80.960) (68.277) (64.873) (94.345) 
      
1976 benchmark 
      
1977   42.775 38.652 -22.997 
   (48.457) (49.368) (159.637) 
      
1978   137.873*** 147.414*** 61.111 
   (46.366) (47.845) (170.186) 
      
1979   52.091 47.480 -106.413 
   (40.582) (42.730) (143.710) 
      
1980   139.139*** 133.360** 1.449 
   (50.973) (53.205) (142.966) 
      
1981   119.300*** 107.786** 20.058 
   (42.872) (43.698) (142.306) 
      
1982   210.921*** 158.724*** -27.653 
   (45.481) (47.330) (144.052) 
      
1983   121.464*** 83.411* -24.302 
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   (47.092) (45.975) (150.253) 
      
1984   179.142*** 113.672** 25.531 
   (48.899) (48.275) (151.951) 
      
1985   159.993*** 99.791* -65.601 
   (51.695) (50.909) (146.619) 
      
1986   112.624*** 90.233** -76.343 
   (42.660) (43.277) (145.759) 
      
1987   133.938*** 101.019** -160.568 
   (42.275) (42.261) (149.306) 
      
1988   65.529 31.682 -188.485 
   (44.358) (44.649) (154.766) 
      
1989   168.063*** 130.029*** -140.395 
   (43.626) (43.967) (153.133) 
      
1990   52.895 23.948 -288.827* 
   (44.064) (44.709) (148.991) 
      
1991   66.919 34.783 -319.030** 
   (41.962) (43.375) (147.649) 
      
1992   80.855* 53.513 -280.411* 
   (46.357) (47.290) (155.428) 
      
1993   87.852* 48.048 -326.597** 
   (44.904) (45.878) (152.569) 
      
1994   185.901*** 157.129*** -296.144* 
   (44.780) (45.879) (153.817) 
      
1995   205.361*** 181.202*** -310.792** 
   (41.853) (42.912) (152.322) 
      
1996   138.063*** 138.374*** -389.600** 
   (39.525) (41.078) (151.299) 
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1997   164.452*** 160.968*** -363.730** 
   (40.540) (42.439) (157.861) 
      
1998   142.745*** 165.654*** -418.983*** 
   (39.378) (41.022) (151.690) 
      
1999   134.655*** 151.768*** -440.979*** 
   (41.058) (42.978) (152.649) 
      
2000   181.451*** 195.048*** -476.516*** 
   (41.806) (42.784) (152.422) 
      
2001   93.470** 121.291*** -527.173*** 
   (39.840) (42.556) (154.171) 
      
2002   246.834*** 297.830*** -350.006** 
   (44.771) (47.278) (157.109) 
      
2003   380.206*** 428.364*** -314.214* 
   (49.582) (50.636) (160.717) 
      
2004   419.586*** 475.428*** -272.108* 
   (48.363) (49.634) (158.638) 
      
2005   533.147*** 588.858*** -265.725 
   (52.580) (54.524) (163.896) 
      
2006   484.120*** 550.653*** -272.711* 
   (46.725) (49.344) (164.053) 
      
2007   502.775*** 569.965*** -418.945** 
   (44.215) (47.247) (164.163) 
      
2008   438.480*** 522.953*** -561.224*** 
   (44.258) (47.775) (167.828) 
      
2009   349.198*** 423.185*** -653.861*** 
   (41.300) (45.130) (166.075) 
      
2010   188.524*** 269.665*** -788.108*** 
   (40.742) (45.468) (167.432) 
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Group 23/302A    -216.958*** -306.405* 
    (52.433) (160.171) 
      
Group 23/303    81.757 -5.391 
    (78.384) (101.808) 
      
Group 23/305A    -110.523** -107.775 
    (54.440) (91.965) 
      
Group 23/305R    -17.576 102.605 
    (61.618) (113.821) 
      
Group 23/306    -37.927 60.621 
    (82.929) (136.773) 
      
Group 23/307    38.725 74.765 
    (101.580) (208.829) 
      
Group 23/313R    -41.804 -34.245 
    (34.383) (87.350) 
      
Group 324/509    -92.897*** -36.889 
    (31.095) (141.370) 
      
Group 324/512    -75.422** 47.922 
    (33.695) (141.859) 
      
Group 324/525    -108.152*** -102.505 
    (30.337) (139.964) 
      
Group 327/129    -95.400*** -42.906 
    (36.790) (149.638) 
      
Group 327/142    -88.848*** 10.382 
    (33.739) (139.721) 
      
Group 327/143    -75.017** 97.082 
    (30.406) (138.340) 
      
Group 348/67    232.757** -617.366** 
Pendency and thickets 
Marek Dietl, Łukasz Skrok, Pablo Benalcazar, Mateusz Gątkowski, Katharine Rockett 23
    (93.506) (294.826) 
      
Group 424/114    100.607** 228.803 
    (42.710) (142.611) 
      
Group 424/195.16    22.114 65.852 
    (56.549) (126.548) 
      
Group 424/78.01    159.769** 122.230 
    (62.214) (122.472) 
      
Group 424/78.02    126.602*** 202.835** 
    (33.687) (97.110) 
      
Group 424/78.08    207.205*** 217.239** 
    (35.503) (103.428) 
      
Group 424/780    160.089*** 0.891 
    (57.054) (116.987) 
      
Group 424/800    87.494 -223.018 
    (103.257) (566.265) 
      
Group 424/801    1,115.605*** 737.136** 
    (179.074) (307.041) 
      
Group 424/802    64.890 -405.220** 
    (274.032) (187.271) 
      
Group 424/803    185.297 585.697 
    (305.657) (556.838) 
      
Group 424/804    291.660** 266.049 
    (113.387) (249.319) 
      
Group 424/805    203.487** 39.601 
    (88.504) (182.621) 
      
Group 424/806    305.267 228.155 
    (202.630) (199.881) 
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Group 424/807    307.302*** 79.061 
    (92.975) (201.208) 
      
Group 424/808    292.760 269.807 
    (189.202) (321.965) 
      
Group 424/94.1    167.220*** 151.444 
    (34.062) (103.933) 
      
Group 433/1    -113.331 -60.380 
    (87.748) (134.493) 
      
Group 433/133    20.919 32.268 
    (42.119) (127.845) 
      
Group 433/167    2.184 134.055 
    (53.256) (139.550) 
      
Group 433/196    209.133* 265.500 
    (118.397) (215.181) 
      
Group 433/2    -70.827 17.655 
    (49.198) (133.281) 
      
Group 433/215    66.701** 188.854* 
    (32.493) (105.639) 
      
Group 433/229    -46.743 69.268 
    (33.456) (108.578) 
      
Group 433/81    54.384 144.999 
    (51.941) (123.072) 
      
Group 433/86    -7.382 110.639 
    (54.089) (166.235) 
      
Group 436/510    2.991 253.185 
    (94.334) (183.123) 
      
Group 436/512    199.922*** 244.686* 
    (59.018) (146.892) 
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Group 436/536    361.958*** 275.828*** 
    (35.424) (105.282) 
      
Group 604/890.1    -147.062*** -284.190 
    (48.980) (236.164) 
      
Group 8/115.51    74.482* 135.089 
    (40.493) (106.775) 
      
Group 8/400    -53.809 -30.962 
    (40.841) (150.947) 
      
Group 8/401    -39.937 -99.836 
    (43.520) (116.020) 
      
Group 8/438    -109.480** -175.387 
    (50.607) (154.841) 
      
Group 8/493    -184.155*** -201.479 
    (43.241) (139.787) 
      
Group 977/778    70.606 241.880** 
    (46.461) (107.599) 
      
Group 977/810    152.553*** 468.933*** 
    (53.478) (143.631) 
      
Group 977/881    -29.774 38.269 
    (40.993) (127.939) 
      
Group 977/903    -84.700 51.556 
    (95.349) (431.493) 
      
Group 977/904    192.646*** 235.327** 
    (50.846) (115.530) 
      
Group 977/963    -31.426 269.361 
    (81.252) (217.655) 
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Note:  *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.     Source: Own Estimates 
 
